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Abstract. Principles of cognitive economy would require that concepts
about objects, properties and relations should be introduced only if they
simplify the conceptualisation of a domain. Unexpectedly, classic logic
conditionals, specifying structures holding within elements of a formal
conceptualisation, do not always satisfy this crucial principle. The pa-
per argues that this requirement is captured by supervenience, hereby
further identified as a property necessary for compression. The resulting
theory suggests an alternative explanation of the empirical experiences
observable in selection tasks, associating human performance with con-
ditionals on the ability of dealing with compression, rather than with
logic necessity.
Keywords: Logic conditional · Logical dependence · Supervenience ·
Compression · Selection task · Cognitive models
1 Introduction
The difficulties—if not the inadequacy—of formal logic in modelling human cog-
nition have been claimed in the literature by numerous authors. Within this dis-
cussion, the celebrity of Wason’s selection task [18] is on par with the simplicity
of the experiment and the unexpectedness of the results. The wide presence of
rule-like conceptual structures (usually in the form of conditionals if.. then..) in
formal and semi-formal structurations of knowledge highly contrasts with the
picture of the human ability of dealing with rules captured by this family of
experiments.
Many hypotheses have been proposed in the last 50 years to explain human
performance in selection tasks, e.g. primitive matching bias [9], the influence of
confirmation bias [14], the existence of separated cognitive modules [5], different
framing processes [17,12], semantic and pragmatic factors influencing the reason-
ing task [17], intervention of dual processing or heuristic-analytic models [9]. The
present paper presents yet another proposal, but its primary objective is rather
to introduce an alternative view on the problem. Instead of focusing on the ar-
tificial, puzzle-like setting of selection tasks (which is problematic—respondents
usually ask explicitly “where is the trick?”), our investigation started from study-
ing the mechanisms of construction of rule-like conceptual structures, generally
⋆ The author would like to thank Jean-Louis Dessalles, Isabelle Bloch and Alexander
Boer for comments and suggestions provided to earlier versions of the paper.
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abounding in human explicit knowledge (taxonomies, mereonomies, realization
structures, etc.). In this line of research, Feldman [10] has shown that, by starting
from some property language in which an observer describes objects and struc-
ture of the world, regularities emerging from the observations can be captured
by a simplification of an algebraic structure made of implication polynomials
(related to Horn clauses). In particular, he proofs that species (e.g. bird as as-
sociated to properties like having wings, feathers, etc.) and trees of species (e.g.
robins as sub-category of birds) can be seen as linear concepts, i.e. structures
that enable a simple algebraic decomposition.
The idea that human cognition is fundamentally based on simplification
mechanisms is an appealing one and has driven several research tracks in the
last decades [3,4,7]; in algorithmic information theory, this has been powerfully
synthesised by the expression “understanding is compression” [2]: the efficacy of
a model, theory or other conceptual structures can be measured by how much
they simplify our cognitive burden, how many observations they can summarise.
If this is true, at qualitative level, the introduction of a new conceptual structure
(like for instance a rule expressed through a logic conditional) requires at least
to satisfy some compression property. Working on this intuition, this paper will:
– present an overview of the notion of supervenience and identify it as a re-
quirement for compression (sections 2.1, 2.2);
– present a method relying on ontological dependence to form a closure of
the antecedent of a logic conditional so that the consequent supervenes it
(section 3.1);
– confirm that taxonomies (as e.g. trees of species) and conceptual compo-
sitions (as e.g. species) are compressing structures, identifying two closure
assumptions (CA-I and CA-II) (sections 3.2, 3.3);
– present and explain the performance of people in selection tasks through the
lens of these closure assumptions (sections 4.1, 4.2).
2 Supervenience
Let us consider a class of objects O that can be described with two properties, a
and b. Each property may hold or not, cases respectively identified with T and
F. If we assume that there is no law that binds one property to the other, then
we have 4 possible configurations that can be represented as a truth table, or, in
a similar spirit to e.g. [10], as a Boolean lattice (a stands for a being F):
a b
T T
T F
F T
F F
ab
ab
ab
ab
The asymmetry of logic conditionals. Suppose now that the following rule holds:
a→ b. Interpreted as a material implication, the logical conditional corresponds
to the constraint ¬a∨b. Because the rule holds, we can remove the configurations
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for which it is false. Differently from assertions based on operators like ∨ and ∧,
a logic conditional introduces an asymmetry on the lattice constructed with the
possible configurations of a and b:
a b a→ b
T T T
F T T
F F T
ab
ab
ab
a b a ∧ b
T T T
ab
a b a ∨ b
T T T
F T T
T F T
ab
ab ab
2.1 Weak supervenience and determination
In order to appreciate the sense of the asymmetry of logic conditionals, we inves-
tigated a more general asymmetric notion: supervenience, introduced in modern
philosophy in the attempt to capture the relation holding amongst different on-
tological levels or strata1, and so enabling the analysis and treatment of emergent
properties or phenomena arising out of more fundamental ones, but not reducible
to them [1].2
In the simplest form, “we have supervenience when there could be no differ-
ence of one sort without differences of another sort” [13, p. 14]. This definition
seems relatively simple; unfortunately, the literature exhibits a proliferation of
non-equivalent formalizations3, distinguished by several modal interactions, dis-
tinct in number and placement of quantifiers over possible worlds or the type
of necessity operators. An interesting exception, that we will use as a starting
point, is the non-modal logic analysis given in [19]:
Definition 1 (Weak supervenience). A set of properties B supervenes an-
other set of properties A if, given any two entities x and y, x cannot differ from
y w.r.t. B properties, without being different w.r.t. A properties.
B supervenes A ≡ ∀x, y : x 6=B y → x 6=A y
As we can see, supervenience decouples the concerns between a base and a
supervenient sets of properties (the strata or levels we referred-to before), and
identifies a directional relation between the two, defined by a constraint on dif-
ferences. Supervenience captures an abstract asymmetric covariation: when it
holds, a difference in the supervenient set let us expect a concurrent difference
1 As an example of ontological stratification, consider how natural sciences specialize
depending on the dimensional scale in focus (e.g. particle physics vs astrophysics).
This is because theories and accounts associated to the different levels of reality are
often so incompatible, that they may be seen as targeting different realities.
2 Historically, supervenience was introduced in support of the recognition of “the exis-
tence of mental phenomena, and their non-identity with physical phenomena, while
maintaining an authentically physicalist world view” [1].
3 In addition to “weak” supervenience, we have “strong”, “global” and many others,
see e.g. [11, p. 79], [16].
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in the base set, but we do not define which type of difference, nor why.4 Fur-
thermore, despite what many believe, the ‘weak’ formulation of supervenience
is not sufficient to be certain of the existence of a direct dependency between
the two sets (e.g. that an object having a property in A has also a property in
B). As observed in [19], the contrapositive of the formula of supervenience only
identifies a determination in terms of “partial” structural equalities:
Definition 2 (Determination). A set of properties A determines another set
of properties B if, given any two entities x and y, when x and y are equal w.r.t.
A properties, they are equal w.r.t. B properties.
A determines B ≡ ∀x, y : x =A y → x =B y
2.2 Supervenience and compression
Despite the “weak” formulation, supervenience can be seen as a requirement for
compression, when the base set A and the supervening set B count as providing
symbols for encodings of entities of a given domain O. Let us denote with xA =
ρA(x) the description of an element x through the set of properties A. Suppose
we collect all co-occurrences of descriptions of all entities in O in A-terms and
in B-terms as instances of a relation ρAB ⊆ 2
A × 2B. In general this relation
is not a function: two different objects x and y might exhibit equality w.r.t. A
(xA = yA) but not w.r.t to B (xB 6= yB), and when this will happen an item in
2A will relate to two items in 2B, so violating the right-unique property required
for functional relations. If supervenience holds, however, equality w.r.t. A will
determine equality w.r.t. B, and so ρAB becomes a function. In these conditions,
there is a mapping between the encoding A towards the encoding B:
ρB(x) = ρAB(ρA(x))
Stated differently, weak supervenience is required to re-encode the description
of the object based on A-properties into a description in terms of B-properties.
Imposing criteria of minimality on the B-encoding, the re-encoding becomes
a compression (generally a lossy one, as the mapping ρAB might not be an
isomorphism).
3 Supervenience and logic conditionals
At first sight, the expression of supervenience in terms of determination (Def. 2)
seems to include the case of the implication expressed by a logic conditional, or
at least to be related to.5 However, going through the possible configurations
shown on the truth table of the conditional, when b varies from T to F, a may
vary (first and third row) but it may also remain F (second and third row):
4 See also Kim [11, p. 167] (italics mine):“[..] supervenience itself is not an explanatory
relation. It is not a ‘deep’ metaphysical relation; rather, it is a ‘surface’ relation that
reports a pattern of property covariation, suggesting the presence of an interesting
dependence relation that might explain it”.
5 Logic conditional is expressed between two individual properties, determination, as
defined here, between sets of properties.
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a b a→ b
T T T
F T T
F F T
ab
ab
ab
In determination terms, this means that we can find two entities of this class
which are equal with respect to a, but which are not equal in respect to b;
therefore, supervenience is not satisfied with a simple conditional.
To repair this problem, we should consider a relation that instantiates that
a always varies when b varies across the configurations. We discover that the
resulting truth table is that of a bi-implication (logical equivalence), introducing
again a strong symmetry (actually replication) amongst the two properties:
a b a↔ b
T T T
T F F
F T F
F F T
ab
ab
If this would be the only repair possibility, however, the introduction of super-
venience would bring about quite a slim advantage.
3.1 Ontological dependence
As we said above, weak supervenience specifies that there is a asymmetric re-
lation between representations made with two sets of properties, but the two
sets may be completely unrelated; for instance, the base set may be empty (free-
floating paradox). To avoid this case, Yoshimi [19] proposes to capture superve-
nience by adding to weak supervenience the constraint of ontological dependence.
In property terms, this would be written as:
Definition 3 (Ontological dependence). A set of properties B depends on
another set A only if all entities that exhibit a B-property, exhibit as well a
A-property:
B depends on A ≡ ∀x, β ∈ B : β(x)→ ∃α ∈ A : α(x)
This property binds the manifestation of each property in B to the manifestation
of at least a property in A. Using the contrapositive, it can be also read as a
sort of closure: if an object does not manifest any property in A, then it does
not manifest any property in B.
Logic conditionals and ontological dependence In the case of a condi-
tional, restricting A to a single property a and B to a single property b, onto-
logical dependence is equivalent to the inverse of the conditional, and therefore
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instantiates the bi-implication case seen above, which we know to satisfy super-
venience. However, the definition given above suggests an alternative path. Let
us consider an additional property a∗ which is true when b is true and a is false
(X means any truth value is possible):
a
∗
a b a→ b
X T T T
T F T T
F F F T
With this simple addition, the set of properties B = {b} supervenes the set A∗ =
{a, a∗}, without modifying the constraint set by the initial logic conditional.
This result can be generalized: the consequent of a conditional supervenes the
antecedent, if adequately closed through ontological dependence. In practice, the
closure set consists of all sufficient conditions determining the consequent. In this
case, because the one provided was not sufficient to produce all manifestations
of the consequent, a new condition has been introduced.
3.2 Supervenience in subsumption
Let us consider a typical use of conditionals at class level, i.e. in subsumption
rules as “all dogs are animals”:
∀x : Dog(x)→ Animal(x)
The closure constraint identified above states that supervenience holds (i.e. the
predicate Animal can compress), only if we consider all the sufficient conditions
for an entity x to be animal, i.e. x belonging to any of the subclasses of animal.
This is intrinsic to the very idea of class: it is not possible that being animal is
true without having any of its known subclasses true:
¬∃x : Animal(x) ∧ ¬Dog(x) ∧ ¬Cat(x) ∧ . . .
This closure assumption (hereby denoted with CA-I) is an intuitive principle
at the base of all taxonomical relations.6 Here, more in general, we have shown
that the presence in the knowledge of a logic conditional joint with the associated
CA-I implies that the consequent compresses the closure of the antecedent:
– when the consequent is false, all possible antecedents are false as well;
– when the consequent is true, at least one antecedent is true.
In these conditions, modus tollens can remove all antecedents in the closure at
once, but also the conditional can be disproven just by finding one antecedent
in the closure which is true when the consequent is false.
6 For simplicity, we are overlooking here the aspects related to hierarchization, e.g.
exclusive disjunction of subclasses at a given level of depth.
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3.3 Supervenience in conceptual composition
The asymmetry of the conditional may be seen in the opposite sense, reading
the absence of a property as a property, an then considering the contrapositive of
the initial conditional (¬b→ ¬a). As in the previous case, in order to guarantee
supervenience of the consequent ¬a, we need to introduce an adequate ¬b∗ for
closure related to ontological dependence:
a
∗
a b a→ b ¬a ¬b ¬b
∗
X T T T F F F
T F T T T F T
F F F T T T X
In this new configuration, we have that ¬A = {¬a} supervenes the set ¬B∗ =
{¬b,¬b∗}. Thus, the negation of the antecedent of a conditional supervenes the
negation of the consequent, if adequately closed through ontological dependence.
Interestingly, this closure can be related to conceptual compositional structures
(including mereonomies, realization structures, causal mechanisms, etc.). Con-
sider for instance the following rule:
∀x : Dog(x)→ hasTail (x)
Although we could in principle consider dogs as a sub-class of the greater class
of entities with a tail, the contrapositive formulation captures a different type of
closure:
¬∃x : ¬Dog(x) ∧ hasTail (x) ∧ hasFur(x) ∧ . . .
In words, one entity cannot have all the properties associated to certain class
without being of that class. This closure assumption (hereby denoted with CA-II)
is at the base of the composition/aggregation of properties as higher-order prop-
erties (wholes, higher-order actions, cause-effects, etc.). In more general terms,
the assertion of a logic conditional with the associated CA-II implies that the
antecedent compresses the closure of the consequent:
– when the antecedent is true, all possible consequents are true as well;
– when the antecedent is false, at least one consequent is false.
In these conditions, modus ponens can produce all consequents in the closure at
once, but also the conditional can be disproven just by finding one consequent
in the closure which is false when the antecedent is true.
4 Reviewing Wason’s selection tasks
Exploiting the framework just presented, we will propose an alternative expla-
nation of human performance in selection tasks, a famous class of behavioural
psychology experiments introduced by Wason at the end of the 1960s [18].
Selection tasks Given a simple rule (usually in the conditional form), respon-
dents are asked to select, amongst few instances, the ones which are relevant to
check whether the rule applies. For instance:
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Example 1. It has been hypothesized that if a person has Ebbinghaus disease,
he is forgetful. You have four patients in front of you: A is not forgetful, B has
the Ebbinghaus disease, C is forgetful, and D does not have the Ebbinghaus
disease. Which patients must you analyse to check whether the rule holds?
In classic logic, when a rule p→ q holds, also the contrapositive ¬q → ¬p holds.
Therefore to check whether a rule holds, you must check:
1. whether the individuals that exhibit p exhibit q as well, and
2. whether the individuals that don’t exhibit q, don’t exhibit p either.
In the previous example, these answers are respectively B and A.
Unexpectedly, evidence shows that humans in tendency perform only the
first of these checks, but not the second. A number of respondents also select
the logically wrong choice q, that could be associated to a biconditional reading
of the rule. Similar results have been observed with selection tasks based on
common-sense and expert domains, and in experiments with layman and experts
(including mathematicians). However, experiments on selection tasks have also
shown clear exceptions to these results when tasks build upon deontic rules, i.e.
rules about norms of conduct. Consider for instance the following task:
Example 2. In your country, a person is not allowed to drink alcohol before the
age of 18. You see four people in a pub: A is enjoying his beer, B is drinking an
orange juice, C is at least 40 years old, and D is no older than 16 years. Which
people must you investigate to check whether the rule is applied?
In this case, the great majority of respondents select A and D, the logically
correct answers.
4.1 Explaining selection tasks via closure assumptions
Many hypotheses have been proposed in the literature to explain these phenom-
ena (see section 1). We construct here yet another explanation, relying on the
closure assumptions identified above. Let us review the previous selection tasks
and two additional scenarios (a subsumption rule and the first selection task
proposed by Wason):
(1) If a person has Ebbinghaus disease, then he is forgetful.
• CA-I: one cannot be forgetful, without having the Ebbinghaus disease
(or any other known cause of being forgetful).
• CA-II: one cannot be forgetful (and any other known effect of the Ebbing-
haus disease) without having the Ebbinghaus disease.
When presented to a causal rule of the type disease-producing-symptom, people
are suggested to apply CA-II, but do not naturally apply CA-I. In effect, there
may be always unknown causes for becoming forgetful, thus, the property of
being forgetful cannot ascend to the status of class. On the other hand, the
framing given by the experiment invite to think that being forgetful is the only
discriminating symptom of the Ebbinghaus disease.
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(2) If you are older than 18 years old, then you are allowed to drink alcohol.7
• CA-I: one cannot be allowed to drink alcohol, without being older than
18 years old (or any other known requirement for drinking).
• CA-II: one cannot be allowed to drink alcohol (and any other known
condition associated to being older than 18 years old), without being
older than 18 years old.
In this case, CA-I and CA-II can be assumed to hold because the very com-
municative purpose of norms is to provide knowledge about both the qualifying
conditions and of their normative effects in a certain social domain.8
(3) If an entity is a dog, then it is an animal.
• CA-I: an entity cannot be an animal, without being a dog, or belonging
to any other subclass of the animal kingdom.
• CA-II: an entity cannot be an animal and all other known properties
discriminating a dog entity, without being a dog.
In this case, both CAs apply, otherwise the concepts of dog and of animal
wouldn’t be functioning properly.
(4) If there is “D” on one side of a card, then there is “3” on the other side.
• CA-I: a card cannot have “3” on one side, without having “D” on the
other side (or any known other symbol mapping from “3”).
• CA-II: a card cannot have “3” on one side, without having “D” on the
other side.
Here CA-II is certainly true: for the 2-sides structure of cards, only one associa-
tion is possible. Viceversa, CA-I is not acceptable in general, because the other
configurations mapping to “3” are not known.
Cognition-as-compression hypothesis The previous analysis suggests a way
to predict which behaviour will be selected by people depending on the concep-
tual structure associated to the proposed selection task. The general scenario
(usually associated to descriptive rules) relates to cases in which only CA-II
applies; supposing the task is in the form p→ q, people will mostly select items
exhibiting p to test whether q is the case. The exceptional scenario, but theo-
retically correct one (usually associated to prescriptive rules), relates to cases in
which both CA-I and CA-II apply; here, people will test ¬q as well.
This behaviour can be explained by assuming that people interpret condition-
als in different ways depending on the attributed compression capacity, which in
turn depends on their domain conceptualization (but not on the descriptive/pre-
scriptive nature of the rule).
7 The proposed modal version follows the institutional causation. Rephrased in tele-
ological form, it becomes: “In order to drink alcohol, you have to be older than 18
years old.”, that can be related to the indicative form: “If you drink alcohol, then
you are older than 18 years old.“
8 From this consideration we can trace the hypothesis that, when confronted with
complex normative structures, people will turn to a conservative, “causal-rule” type
of interpretation.
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Stated differently, in selection tasks, they don’t test the CAs, but they test the
conditional’s compression capacity enabled by the CAs:
– when only CA-II is deemed to apply, people focus on the antecedent: does the
antedecent effectively compress? To confirm this, one has to check whether,
when the antecedent is present, all consequents in the closure are present as
well (i.e. that q holds on p), see section 3.2.
– when both CA-I and CA-II are deemed to apply, people concentrate on
both antedecent and consequent. In addition to the previous test, does the
consequent effectively compress? To answer this question, if the consequent
is absent, one has to check whether all antecedents in the closure are absent
as well (i.e. that ¬p holds on ¬q), see section 3.3.
Interestingly, this account gives also some insights on why people might select q:
the biconditional reading corresponds to force supervenience (compressibility) on
the conditional without looking at closure assumptions (see beginning section 3);
but also on why the conditional might be deemed irrelevant (e.g. as in Wason’s
defective truth table): when only CA-II applies, and the antecedent is false, the
compression mechanism is not activated.
Conclusion
The intuition starting our investigation was that supervenience might act as a
common denominator for ordering relations creating ontological stratifications :
taxonomical structures (ordered by the subsumption), mereological structures
(ordered by part-whole relations), supervenience structures (ordered by asym-
metric dependencies), realization structures (ordered by functional relations),
nomological structures, etc. [1]. This paper introduces a crucial argument in
support to this intuition: any meaningful abstraction requires compression, and
supervenience counts as a necessary requirement for compression. We have then
analysed through this lens subsumption and conceptual composition, in the sense
of general aggregation of properties (relevant to mereological structures, realiza-
tion structures and causal mechanisms), identifying two closure assumptions
enabling supervenience on logic conditionals. As an unexpected by-product, we
obtained an alternative explanation of human performance in selection tasks.
By reframing the reasoning process activated by selection tasks in terms of
evaluating the compression capacity of the proposed rules (taken as prototypical
example of knowledge constructs) rather than testing their logic validity, our
theory supports a positive view on human cognition, rather than a negative one
(as suggested by words like bias). More concretely, it shows that the distinc-
tion between general and exceptional performance is not caused by the content
in itself (of descriptive or of prescriptive nature), but by the closure assump-
tions through which this is processed. This is compatible with other hypotheses
insisting on contextual aspects: experimental framing can indeed modify such
closure assumptions for the observers, but clearly also their personal knowledge
and dispositions might play a role (see e.g. [6]: unschooled subjects commonly
refuse to reason with given premises or provide their own premises as a basis for
reasoning).
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Going beyond the selection task literature, in recent times, indicative con-
ditionals have attracted a renewed interested, reinvigorating the debate around
Adams’ thesis: the acceptability of an indicative conditional sentence goes by the
conditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent. Empirical observa-
tions [8] show that this principle is not descriptively correct, and several authors
started working on identifying additional conditions of dependence (see e.g. [15]).
In future work, we plan to evaluate the proposal advanced in this paper w.r.t.
these other contributions.
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